This is the accepted version of the paper.
Introduction
The disciplinary processes governing lawyers have been a defining feature of self-regulation.
In many jurisdictions, such processes are being re-shaped to conform to best practice in business regulation. The environment of practice for lawyers continues, however, to be quite different from that of other sectors. A major consideration is the fact that the practice environment is shaped by professionally focused rules and processes, as interpreted and enacted by the main actors: practitioners, organisations and regulators. The performance of these actors helps to determine the strength of the profession compared with other stakeholders, including government. Reform agendas reflect a profession's record on regulatory issues. Periods of crisis or moral panics sometimes lead to reform that is reactive rather than strategic.
2 This paper considers the impact of a major professional scandal. It examines how the key players interacted and how the ethical environment of practice might have affected an individual's propensity for transgression. It also considers how the perceived lessons of the crisis influenced reform in England and Wales.
Authority (SRA). The SRA concluded the investigations of solicitors charged in connection with the coal health scandal and presented cases to the SDT. The SRA is now an authorised regulator of ABSs 20 and has substantially revised the code of conduct for solicitors so that it can regulate the range of solicitor organisations and ABSs under one disciplinary regime.
The Coal Health Schemes
In 1993, miners suffering from work-related illnesses commenced actions for personal injury against the British Coal Corporation (BCC). One set of actions concerned vibration white finger (VWF), a condition caused by using vibrating tools. In 1994 the VWF cases were consolidated into a group action, and in 1996 judgment on a preliminary issue established grounds for BCC's liability for VWF. 21 In 1997 lead actions established the extent of injury loss and damage. In 1998 negotiations took place with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), successor to BCC, for managing the claims outside the court process. Meanwhile, in January 1998, the High Court found BCC negligent in relation to a second set of actions concerning respiratory disease resulting from work in the dusty environment of coal mines.
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These conditions, including chronic bronchitis and emphysema, were known collectively as
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Under court direction, two time-limited
Claims Handling Agreements (CHAs), one for VWF and one for COPD, were created to dispose of the many outstanding claims and to deal with new claims presented under the schemes.
The Claims Handling Agreements were essentially contracts between the DTI and the miners' solicitors. The CHA for COPD was negotiated between the DTI and representatives of the large number of firms representing claimants, referred to as the Claimants' Solicitors Group (CSG). 23 Each CHA defined the role and responsibilities of claimants' solicitors, the DTI's claims handlers and medical assessors and others involved in the process. In most litigation, courts routinely assess the reasonableness of costs, 24 but it was thought that considerable time and expense would be saved if a tariff of scale fees payable by the DTI 20 On 13 June 2011 the Legal Services Board approved the Solicitors Regulation Authority as a Licensing Authority for ABSs, which were to become operational before the end of 2011 (see www.sra.org.uk/abs). 21 Armstrong v BCC [1996] EWCA Civ 1049. 22 
Griffiths v British Coal Corporation [1998] EWHC 2008 (QB) (Cardiff HC) (reported as Rees v British Coal).
23 Claims Handling Agreement (England and Wales) between the Department of Trade and Industry and the British Coal Respiratory Disease Litigation Claimants Solicitors Group (CSG), 24 September 1999, www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/supporting%20consumers/coal_health/publications/file17630. pdf. 24 In the High Court this is usually done after the event by a costs judge.
were set for the solicitors' costs of successful claimants. The CHAs were approved by the supervising judges. The DTI reported three to four times a year to the judge supervising each scheme, and there were further negotiations and agreements in the course of dealing with the claims. A steering group led by the firms of solicitors that had negotiated the CHA represented the collective interests of claimants in this process.
The idea behind the Coal Health Schemes was that miners could submit details of their claims, which would be assessed using employment records and medical evidence, without each claim having to go before a court. Claimants retained the right to pursue a common law claim and could withdraw from the CHA and litigate. Entitlement to an award and its value were determined by the terms of the CHA. Compensation would be payable according to a tariff. To begin the claims process, each claimant completed an application. COPD claimants provided details of ill health, work history and smoking habits and took a Spirometry Test for lung function. 25 This record was lodged with a solicitor, who registered it with the claims handler. About 50 respiratory specialists were employed at assessment centres throughout the country to assess COPD claims. Industry noted that the volume of claims was higher than expected. At the time of judgment in the lead case there were 6,000 identified COPD cases, and this figure was expected to rise to a maximum of 70,000. The Department admitted, however, that it had no basis for estimating the total number of applicants. In fact, 172,000 COPD claims had been settled in full by January 2005, and final offers had been made in another 179,827 cases. 28 In all, £1.1 billion in compensation had been paid for VWF and £1.29 billion for COPD, 29 whereas
British Coal originally had allowed only £50 million in their accounts to cover their liability.
Worse, the settled claims were only part of a total of an estimated 576,000 COPD claims 30 for which the DTI expected to pay about £7.5 billion in compensation. 31 Members of Parliament were incandescent, demanding to know who was to blame. 25 Select Committee on Trade and Industry Fourteenth Report (2005), ch 2, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmtrdind/375/37505.htm. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
On 21 July 2005, Malcolm Wicks, Minister for Energy at the DTI, announced an external review of the schemes to be undertaken by Stephen Boys Smith, a former Home Office official, and two others. 32 Suspicions regarding the operation of the scheme were reflected in the remit, which included reviewing 'the integrity of the administration of the scheme for dealing with coal health claims; to identify any specific measures needed to improve the administration of the scheme; to consider whether there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent, detect and pursue fraud …' 33 The Boys Smith report, released in December 2005, criticised the choice of such schemes to administer large numbers of cases and the cost involved. 34 While there was no evidence of fraud, the report intimated that anti-fraud measures that had been implemented later in the schemes would have reduced the possibility.
Legal costs were identified as an area of potential saving. While the costs tariff negotiated with the Claimants' Solicitors Group appeared reasonable at the start of the scheme, it was arguably too generous for routine claims handling. Responding to the report, the Minister claimed that some £200 million could have been saved by reducing 'unnecessary' legal costs. 35 A later report revised the various estimates of cost but also failed to find fault with the miners or their lawyers. In April 2007 a National Audit Office report estimated that when all claims were settled £4.1 billion would have been paid in compensation, with a further £2.3 billion spent on administration costs, payments to miners' legal representatives, contractors, and the Scheme's own legal costs. 36 The report identified 'significant weaknesses' in government handling of the Coal Health Scheme. For example, the costs agreement initially reached with solicitors had no mechanism for review, with the result that the COPD scheme alone paid £295 million more than necessary. 37 Moreover, whereas the median award under the COPD scheme was £1,500, the average solicitors' fees per case were £1,920.
The unexpectedly high cost of the Coal Health Scheme was caused by the explosion of claims, far more than budgeted for. As to costs, while the lawyers' rates of pay may have been over-generous for routine claims handling, it was hardly the CSG's fault if the government's agencies had negotiated a bad deal. Further, the accusations subsequently levelled against solicitors-that they overcharged the clients they represented under the Coal Health Scheme-did not add to the Scheme's cost to the public. These issues did not, however, lead solicitors to the SDT. What many people think was the core of the scandal was that the solicitors subsequently disciplined had charged their clients costs additional to the scale fees paid by the DTI under the Coal Health Scheme. Arguably, however, they had every right to make additional charges. It was how those charges were levied that led to disciplinary action and determined the different degrees of culpability found.
'Overcharging'
A popular misconception in the coal health scandal is that solicitors were found guilty of overcharging. In most cases, this was not so. The rule infractions tended to be more technical, concerning breaches of strict requirements for collecting costs from clients. There are broadly two ways in which successful litigants may be required to pay their own solicitor's costs in bringing a claim. The first way is when clients do not recover all their costs from the losing party and are then required to pay the solicitor for the extra work done on the case-so-called solicitor and own client costs. 38 The second way is when clients have entered a conditional fee agreement under which the other side is not required to pay the uplift on the fee permitted by such agreements.
Solicitor and own client costs arise in litigation because, under English law, the court has a wide discretion to order one of the parties to pay some or all litigation costs to one of the parties. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the costs of the successful party.
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These are usually standard costs, meaning the costs that have been reasonably incurred.
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Individual items of costs may also be disallowed, and these costs may be recoverable from clients as solicitor and own client costs. This usually arises when costs were incurred as a result of the client's unreasonable behaviour or instructions. 41 Clients who are dissatisfied with the solicitor's bill can apply for detailed assessment by the court. 42 Although the principle of proportionality applies to costs, it is recognised that in small claims in particular, The terms of the Coal Health CHAs specified that panel solicitors would be paid fixed fees by the DTI for all successful claims. The scale of costs for the COPD scheme ranged from £1,700 to £2,300 depending on the value of the claim. The agreement with the DTI declared:
'these agreed fees will represent the total sums payable to the Claimant's representatives in relation to the claim. The DTI will not be liable for any additional fees or disbursements …'
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The DTI scheme, therefore, did not explicitly provide that solicitors could not seek costs from miners in either successful or unsuccessful claims, only that the DTI would not be liable for additional costs. Construing the terms of the CHA in context, it did not address the possibility 43 The Costs Practice Direction: Supplement to CPR Parts 43-48, October 2011, para 11(2), www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_parts43-48#IDAAHUJC. 44 CFAs were legalised by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, but did not come into force until 1995. 45 For background and description see Boon and Levin (n 7) 246-51. 46 'A costs order made in any proceedings may, subject in the case of court proceedings to the Rules of Court, include provision requiring the payment of any fees payable under a conditional fee agreement which provides for a success fee' (Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58A(6), as amended by the Access to Justice Act 1999 ss 27 and 28). 47 Based on factors such as the merits and value of the claim, likelihood of settlement, estimated costs involved, and likelihood of recovery of costs from the other party. 48 In such circumstances the claimant's liability for costs to the other side is insurable by 'after the event' insurance, ie insurance taken out after the accident in a personal injury claim but before the action is brought. 65 Ibid, para 2(4). 66 Ibid, para 2(10)(a). 67 Ibid, para 2(11). 68 Ibid, para 2(2). The Gazette reported that the ethics committee was revising guidance on referral fees and that, while the Council 'would be interested in looking at draft rules which permit payments for referrals in certain circumstances that could not have a negative impact on the client's interests and the solicitor's independence', any changes would take time to draft and be approved. In the meantime, and ' 
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The Gazette then worked through a number of examples. One was charging the same fixed fees for each case, which was likely to be seen as a referral fee because the amount of work per case might vary. The second was solicitors paying sums as a condition of joining schemes, so they had no choice but to 'buy' the services. Because the 'reward' to the introducer was the agreement to buy the services, this also was likely to be seen as a referral fee. Both examples were directly relevant to the circumstances under which solicitors obtained Coal Health Scheme clients.
The Law Society's statement ended, however, with the following assurance:
The Law Society's compliance board has, however, given careful consideration as to whether the regulation directorate of the Society should undertake a general 75 'Introductions and Referrals' Law Society Gazette, 18 July 2003, www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/title-19. 76 Ibid.
investigation into firms who were members of schemes, and who were, in the light of the judgments, paying referral fees in breach of the rule. On balance, the compliance board has concluded that little regulatory purpose would be served in pursuing such an investigation. This decision is limited in nature and does not affect existing investigations.
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The problem for many solicitors caught by this 'clarification' of the rules was that miners had already signed up to make payments to their unions or other introducers before the solicitors were instructed. Accepting the terms in those agreements was, in most cases, a condition of receiving the work. Solicitors had not queried the unions' right to charge the fee or their own obligation to collect it from the clients. They had certainly not thought to advise clients that it might not be in their interests to pay it or that they might avoid paying it by taking their business elsewhere.
In October 2004 the Introduction and Referral Code was amended by the addition of section
2A, containing seven paragraphs of additional rules. The amended Introduction and Referral
Code qualified the previous blanket prohibition, stating that 'a solicitor must not make any payment to a third party in relation to the introduction of clients to the solicitor, except as permitted below'. 78 Payment was then allowed provided that 'immediately upon receiving the referral and before accepting instructions to act the solicitor provides the client with all relevant information concerning the referral and, in particular, the amount of any payment'.
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Additionally, the solicitor had to be satisfied that the introducer had provided all relevant information to the client and had not acted in such a way that, if the introducer were a solicitor, the actions would breach the practice rules. This was intended, in particular, to cover restrictions on the content of advertising applying to solicitors.
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The amended Introduction and Referral Code did contain a provision that created some potential for confusion. It was stated that the prohibition on payments to third parties included 'any other consideration but does not include normal hospitality, proper disbursements or normal business expenses'. 81 This was intended to clear up doubt about the payment to third parties of their 'genuine expenses', but such a distinction was, in many cases, difficult to draw. Where, for example, the deduction was said to be for the union's 77 
Ibid. 78 Solicitors Introduction and Referral Code 1990 (as amended 7 October 2004)
. 79 Ibid, Rule 2A(3). 80 Ibid, Rule 4(a) and (b). 81 Ibid, Rule 2A(3). where solicitors were using a CFA to recover the expense of paying a referral fee to an introducer, they potentially broke Rule 3.03, which prohibited solicitors from sharing professional fees with any person who was not either a lawyer or employee.
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In most cases disciplinary charges relating to referral fees accompanied other charges.
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity regarding what constituted a referral fee, and the profession's stance on referral fees, were raised by respondents before the SDT. 83 The The schemes did not explicitly rule out solicitors charging fees of successful claimants … Neither the DTI nor the solicitors anticipated this as a problem at the time the schemes were negotiated, though in the case of the solicitors there was a potential conflict in that their interests and those of the claimants they represented were not necessarily at one on this matter.
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The report itself also argued that the legal profession rather than the government should take action.
In January 2006 the Law Society had established an independent complaint-handling arm, the This was the contextual and legal backdrop to proceedings before the Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal.
The Disciplinary Context
The ethical principle underpinning most of the charges in the SDT was breach of fiduciary duty to clients. At the start of the period covered by the CHAs, conduct was governed by the Solicitors Practice Rules. The essence of nearly all the charges was that solicitors improperly deducted monies from client damages. Some did so because they thought they were entitled to take cases on a contingency, or 'no win, no fee', basis and deduct a fee from clients' damages. Others did so in order to recoup charges that miners had paid to an intermediary, like a trade union, which had processed the case. 
SDT hearing: 27-29 April 2009
The cases of Andrew Nulty and John Trotter were eventually heard by the SDT in April
2009
. 128 The applicant, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, was represented by Timothy Dutton QC. The respondents were separately represented, Nulty by Gregory Treverton-Jones
QC. An application to have the proceedings struck out or stayed had failed on 1 July 2008.
The tribunal had also declined to hear the case in camera, on the grounds that there was no exceptional hardship or prejudice to either respondent to justify such a move. At the April hearing Treverton-Jones again applied to have the proceedings adjourned or stayed sine die, but the tribunal refused to reconsider unless there was fresh evidence.
Treverton-Jones then produced a medical report stating that Nulty was so distressed he could not cope with the paperwork required for the hearing and did not want to attend for fear he might feel aggressive and behave inappropriately. The tribunal heard detailed medical testimony confirming Nulty's distress. A doctor told the SDT that, although Nulty was 'a very wealthy man and was now a tax exile', he had lost 'everything else such as his career, his marriage and his life, which were more important things'. 129 When she interviewed him in June 2008 he had seemed pleasant but anxious, but by September he was tearful and entertaining suicidal thoughts. He had found the press very intrusive and had felt unsafe in his own home.
Treverton-Jones said Nulty had inexplicably driven his motorcycle off a 50-metre cliff the previous November. He suggested that there might be no public interest in pursuing Nulty.
Although the miners' cases had excited great interest in 2006, he said, the press were not even there to hear the present proceedings; interest had 'evaporated'. 130 If any case ever illustrated that money could not buy happiness, he said, this was it. Citing authority that it was not in the public interest to pursue proceedings when there was unchallenged medical evidence of a lack of fitness to appear, 131 counsel again applied for adjournment sine die.
For the applicant, Dutton objected to the medical evidence on the ground that Nulty had refused to attend a meeting with a psychiatrist nominated by the SRA, although he had attended his own doctor twice, once before the application to stay the proceeding in June and once after, in anticipation of the present hearing. He submitted that the evidence showed that noted that the respondent apparently visited his children in the UK regularly, no GP records were presented to support the submission, and there was no suggestion that Nulty wished to appear at a later date. The SDT therefore declined Nulty's request to adjourn the case sine die, stating that it must be heard to 'ensure the proper protection of the reputation of the profession'. The second set of circumstances, giving rise to the third charge, concerned situations in which conditional fee agreements were issued. The way in which the charge was framed in relation to this situation was complex. The specific breach alleged related to Practice Rule 9, which prohibited solicitors from entering arrangements with firms charging contingency fees in personal injury cases. 136 This provision was concerned with preserving the solicitor's independence and ability to act in the best interests of clients when making or receiving 135 It is not clear why holding an interest in referral companies did not constitute a separate allegation of conflict of interest. 136 That is 'an arrangement for the introduction of clients with or act in association with any person (not being a solicitor) whose business or any part of whose business is to make, support or prosecute (whether by action or otherwise, and whether by a solicitor or agent or otherwise) claims arising as a result of death or personal injury and who in the course of such business solicits or receives contingency fees in respect of such claims' (Solicitors' Practice Rules, Rule 9.1).
referrals. The applicant's case was that Sureclaim Ltd was clearly a business which supported or prosecuted claims arising as a result of death or personal injury and, it was contended, it solicited and received contingency fees in respect of such claims from Avalon. Indeed, Mr
Dutton suggested that while Avalon had received over £40 million from coal mining cases, Sureclaim had received another £25 million.
The Nulty's defence to the charge that Avalon had charged contingency fees was that other solicitors and referrers had claimed that charging success fees under the CHAs was 'the done thing'. It was not, however, the principle of success fees that was the problem but the method of calculation.
The fifth charge was that the respondents had failed to give adequate information to clients in accordance with the Solicitors Costs Information and Client Care Code ('Client Care Code'), contrary to Rule 1(a), (c) and (d) and/or 15 of the Conduct Rules. The tribunal heard that although contingency fees were illegal, additional charges would have been allowed had Avalon disclosed the true position on costs to clients in advance. In a majority of cases, however, the client care letter required to be sent out at the beginning of the case did not even state that the DTI would be paying Avalon's costs on successful claims. Indeed, it appeared that Avalon attempted to conceal rather than disclose the circumstances under which they made extra charges. This conclusion was supported by a practice, described as a pattern, whereby Avalon obtained signed CFAs from miners. Avalon would typically send a client care letter, as required by the conduct rules, ignoring the need to explain the basis on which charges would be made. Avalon's letter did, however, enclose a form confirming instructions to act for clients to sign. On receipt of the signed instructions to act, Avalon sent the CFA with a covering letter saying it had been 'mistakenly omitted' from the first letter. 137 Of the 19 files inspected from just one of Avalon's teams, this 'mistake' occurred 17 times.
The sixth charge was pursued against Nulty alone. On the face of it the allegation was technical, although it may be indicative of Nulty's disregard for the both letter of the law and the rules. 138 During correspondence with the Law Society it was noted that a non-solicitor was described on Avalon's letterhead as 'managing partner'. This was contrary to the Solicitors Publicity Code 1990, which prohibited holding out non-solicitors as solicitors 139 and non-partners as partners. 140 This person then wrote to the Law Society saying that he had resigned and his name would be removed from the letterhead. This was confirmed by a letter from Nulty on which the same person's name appeared as 'consultant', a designation that also offended the code by implying that the person held a current practising certificate. asked the firm to confirm that it had not taken a fee in addition to that paid by the DTI but, if it had, to remit any non-DTI fee to clients. The firm replied:
… we can confirm that our British Coal scheme was instigated in August 2003 and confirm that no monies whatsoever are to be deducted from the client and as a practice we rely solely upon receiving fees set by the DTI. 140 Ibid, s 7(a)(iii). 141 Ibid, s 7(a)(iv). 142 The transcript states that this was also contrary to rule 17.01, but this rule relates to waivers, which are not relevant. 143 Ibid, 16, para 31.
least another four months. Nulty claimed that he did not recall sending the letter, but the signature appeared to be his.
In delivering its judgment the SDT found many ordinary breaches of the Solicitors Practice
Rules, but in almost all of these there were additional and unusual factors. The payments to the claims management companies introducing miners' cases violated the referral code, and advertising by the companies contravened the Solicitors Publicity Code. The fact that Nulty or his relatives had an interest in these companies, a clear and undisclosed conflict of interest, was an exacerbating feature. This was 'a network of companies which was designed to confuse with regard to the payment of referral fees'. 144 Similarly, the SDT found that the coal health cases were contentious business, despite the CHA, and that the success fee deductions were therefore illegal contingency fees. To add to this breach, however, there was the confusing sequence of client care letters, which seemed to serve no purpose but to hook clients before springing the CFA on them. The SDT found that Nulty had designed the threeletter system to confuse clients regarding the payment of referral fees. The tribunal noted that, by the time Avalon repaid deductions from damages to miners, the damage to the reputation of the profession had been done.
The SDT also accepted that Nulty had sent the letter to the Secretary of State. Any honest and reasonable member of the public would have regarded the reply, particularly the assertion that no money was deducted from clients, as dishonest under the Twinsectra test. 145 The SDT therefore found that Nulty had been dishonest in his reply. According to the transcript, however, while his conduct in relation to the referral fee and contingency fee charges was described as a 'calculated deception' and 'a disgrace to the profession', 146 an explicit finding of dishonesty was not applied to either. Nevertheless, the tribunal 'had no hesitation in concluding that the public needed to be protected from [Nulty]'. 147 In addition to being struck from the roll of solicitors, he was ordered to pay 90 per cent of the Applicant's costs, estimated at £180,000. The SDT found that Trotter, the second respondent, had not directly benefited from the referral fee arrangement but had overseen some of the activity and had received complaints as Complaints Partner. He must have been aware that what was going on at Avalon was wrong. He was fined £15,000 and ordered to pay £10,000 towards costs. In most of the cases before the SDT involving coal health firms the implication of the decision is that there was not merely a technical breach of the rules, but such breaches constituted cheating of clients. Cheating is the violation of rules in order to take advantage of someone with whom one is in a cooperative relationship 148 and therefore a betrayal of trust.
'Cheating' is not of itself a disciplinary offence, just as it is not a crime, 149 but a component of offences. Striking off a lawyer usually requires a finding of clear moral wrongdoing 150 so, for example, in a recent case, it was held that all but trivial cases involving dishonesty should result in striking off. 151 In this case study, the transcript implies that the dishonesty lay in the response to the letter to the DTI denying that Avalon was deducting money from miners' damages. As regards the deductions from damages, therefore, it is not immediately obvious where the line between 'mere cheating' and dishonesty lies.
Aftermath
The Coal Health Scheme continued to be controversial. In July 2009 a report in the Law Society Gazette suggested that solicitors may have been insufficiently diligent in pursuing compensation. 152 A medical professor explained that COPD was easy to diagnose but it was difficult to separate work related causes from others, like smoking. Damages were reduced when non-work related causes were implicated in an individual's condition. A few points either way on a causal spectrum could make a big difference to damages. Yet, the CHA fixed costs regime provided no incentive to challenge the initial diagnosis. Under the COPD scheme solicitors collected the basic costs, £1,920, for merely accepting the first offer. If they challenged the inital diagnosis they only got an additional £298 if successful and nothing if unsuccessful.
The Law Society Gazette article suggested that solicitors could maximise their incomes by processing large numbers of claims rather than fighting the marginal ones. 153 A to the claims company on settlement. He objected that he had not been told that the costs would be paid by the DTI if he succeeded or that he could go to a solicitor, avoiding the fee.
He was not the only miner in this situation. The court heard that the claims company's assets had rocketed from virtually nothing to £8 million by dint of the schemes.
The case was appealed to the High Court, 158 which assiduously explored grounds on which it might find against the claims management company and for the miner. It proved difficult, however, to find a legal principle to support a decision in his favour. It was not argued on appeal that the union's duty was the same as a solicitor's or that there was any duty to advise on conflict of interest. In the absence of such a duty there was no legal principle on which to hang a remedy: no misrepresentation, no implied term that was necessary to give the contract business efficacy, and no unconscionable bargain. The claimant therefore failed, illustrating the key role played by technical, professional rules in compensating miners and punishing solicitors.
The experience of the use of claims management companies is cautionary. These companies have been touted by proponents of reform as supporting access to justice, but they depend on referral fees for profits. In his report on the cost of civil litigation, Lord Justice Jackson stated:
It is a regrettably common feature of civil litigation, in particular personal injuries litigation, that solicitors pay referral fees to claims management companies, before-theevent ('BTE') insurers and other organisations to 'buy' cases. Referral fees add to the costs of litigation, without adding any real value to it. I recommend that lawyers should not be permitted to pay referral fees in respect of personal injury cases.
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Apparently as a result of its experience in the coal health scandal, the Law Society called for a ban on referral fees, 160 as did the Bar. 161 In May 2011 the LSB decision paper on referral fees stated:
The Board continues to hold the view that the purely regulatory case for a general ban in the legal services market has not been made out. This is because sufficient evidence of consumer detriment, which would have been needed to merit a ban, has not been found.
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In September 2011, despite probable incompatibility with UK and EU competition law, 163 the government issued a press release announcing that it would adopt Jackson LJ's recommendation. 164 At the same time, however, as legal aid cuts bite deeper there is increasing pressure to legalise contingency fees.
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The press continued to pursue Andrew Nulty after the case ended, rehashing the story with pictures of his villa and accounts of his lavish Spanish lifestyle. set, Falcon Chambers, suggested that one of their barristers was briefed to obtain a freezing injunction over property belonging to Nulty in the UK in order to prevent removal of assets overseas pending recovery of the costs of disciplinary proceedings. 166 The proceedings were apparently settled before a full hearing. 167 In Moneysavingexpert.com 170 asked whether this was good value. Other contributors to the website were incredulous. All that was required to reclaim PPI was to post one letter and there was even a good chance that the bank would find you first. The website claimed that Gladstone Brooks was managed by Anthony Chorlton, formerly of Avalon solicitors, that one of two women company directors was Chorlton's wife, 171 and that Andrew Nulty was connected to the company.
Discussion
The purpose of this discussion is to throw light on the question of why lawyers break their code of ethics, exploring the inter-relation of three factors: the propensity of the individual for transgression, the nature of the organisation they belong to, and the regulatory Theorists after Sutherland assert that deviance results from a coincidence of motivation and opportunity, the attractiveness of the latter being determined by prospective gains, potential risks, compatibility with ideas, beliefs and rationalisations, and any other available opportunities (the actor's opportunity structure). 175 This does not explain why some succumb to temptation and others do not. As seems obvious, delinquency is probably the result of individual propensity for transgression; one of the few commonplaces of criminology is that those involved in one type of illegitimate activity are more likely to be involved in others. 176 Abel concludes that the attorneys in his case studies involved in financial impropriety were driven by 'need or greed'. 177 Although this is a deliberate simplification, Nulty's behaviour justifies a little deeper examination against this generalisation.
Acquisitiveness is a common motive for deviance, but it is not always driven by greed.
Coleman suggests that we need only acknowledge that wealth and success are the central goals of human endeavour to understand this. 178 The 'culture of competition' fuelled by capitalism causes blurry lines between entrepreneurship, commercial innovation and deviant economic activity. Social inequality causes crime at both ends of the social scale because the wealthy come to feel that their power is legitimate and their exploitation of others justified.
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For some, the outcome is its own justification; only 'the most capable and the hardestworking individuals emerge victorious'. 180 More strange, however, was the fact that the wealth accrued by these means did not seem to constitute a particularly significant part of Nulty's fortune. The SDT noted that improper deductions had eventually been repaid, so given his reported fortune and Spanish property, the conclusion must be that Nulty had become a very rich solicitor by legitimate means. If Avalon's success meant that need was not a factor, why did Nulty need referral companies, the 'two-letter system' and flawed conditional fee agreements to generate relatively small sums?
The role of organisations in professional deviance is somewhat underplayed, partly because those prosecuted are often not controlling significant operations. 189 The same has been the case in professional practice in relation to discipline: the focus of attention, certainly before the SDT, has tended to be the individual rather than the organisation. One issue that is identified in both the criminological literature and the literature on professional discipline is the prevalence of those with low social standing before courts and tribunals. Indeed, Sutherland's original purpose in focusing on white-collar crime was to challenge the myth that deviance was the preserve of the lower classes. He argued that the statistics could be explained by the fact that prosecutions might not be brought against those from elite groups, or that they failed when they were. 190 Abel's review of the literature on the professional sphere also found that sole practitioners and small firm lawyers are disproportionately represented in disciplinary cases. 191 This means that examples are often small-scale, repeated infractions, frequently resulting from ignorance, indifference or inattention 192 and tending to be seen as individual, 'unique and unrepeated '. 193 How far does the pattern of discipline in the coal health scandal confirm that serious sanctions fall on solicitors from smaller units?
The solicitors that were struck off as a result of the coal health scandal were not from small organisations, but neither were they elite. For example, despite an impressive turnover and large workforce, Avalon was not a typical medium to large law firm. It only had the same number of partners or, indeed, qualified staff, as a small law firm. These key personnel, usually only two partners, operated with minimal peer constraints. As in small firms, there was nobody to question the propriety of the firm's routines. Avalon's business model was also unusual for a law firm. It had large numbers of one kind of client suffering one kind of harm and even seeking redress from one entity. Having adopted this modus operandi to deal with the coal health claims, Avalon had limited expertise to deal with other kinds of work.
The way it intended to deal with this problem in the future was possibly glimpsed in the unfinished interview with The Lawyer. The plan was to identify an area where compensation claims could be made routine, to focus all attention on it until that seam of work was exhausted and to then move on to another such area. As the coal health cases illustrate, 189 Sutherland's deliberately vague definition of 'white collar crime' was 'crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation', but his original text often describes the acts of relatively lowly employees (n 173). 190 For these reasons, but also because some disciplinary infractions are not crimes, we use 'deviance', a more neutral term. 191 Abel (n 172) 54-55. 192 Ibid. market-driven philosophy, which implicitly espoused an entrepreneurial spirit over a public service ethos, 199 caused moral ambiguity and confusion. It may be charitable to suggest that this contributed to delay in getting to grips with the scandal. It seems likely, however, that the uncertainty surrounding referral fees and, to some extent, conditional fee arrangements, exacerbated the crisis, especially since unclear boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate money-making activity is one of the six neutralisation strategies identified by Coleman. 200 In the event, the regulator charged a large number of coal health panel solicitors with offences connected with the schemes. This apparently included some charged with referral fee offences, despite the moratorium announced when the rules were 'clarified' in 2003. This raises the issue of whether they were pursued because of pressure to discipline solicitors. It is clear that, even before the House of Lords weighed in, coal health solicitors, and the Law Society, were being pursued by ministers. As can be seen from the brief extracts cited, the House of Lords managed to raise the moral stakes. In many respects, therefore, the miners' costs scandal resembles a 'moral panic', 201 a term coined by Stanley Cohen to describe an episode or group posing a threat to societal values and interests. 202 In the classic scenario the negative impact of behaviour is identified by 'moral entrepreneurs', generating hostility towards a group, the 'folk devils'. A widely supported consensus develops and the 'folk devils', often weak and disorganised, are unable to resist disproportionate opprobrium and action. To some extent, the literature may also throw some light on the significance of the group identity of the victims of the scandal in creating this dynamic.
The literature on white-collar crime suggests that there are 'unapproved victims', 203 meaning those not considered fair game, even by perpetrators. The miners, despite early suspicion that some might have brought fraudulent claims, eventually fitted this bill. They were portrayed by Lord Lofthouse as admirable, even heroic, yet vulnerable to exploitation. In addition to establishing the moral dimension of the panic their Lordships may also have helped to generate the volume of complaints needed to build a profile of cases and convince the authorities to prosecute. 204 In Cohen's theory, while the typical moral panic passes, the volatile political situation it causes often leads to disproportionate action. In considering the consequences attributable to the miners' costs scandal, it is debateable where they begin and end. It has apparently informed the risk-based regulation policies being developed by the SRA. 205 It was expressly cited by the SRA and LSB 206 as justification for the massive fines brought in to punish breaches of licence by ABAs. 207 Less tangible, but perhaps more significant, however, has been the loss of the legal profession's claim to the 'moral high ground' in ethical matters. 208 This may contribute to the professional body's contribution on regulatory issues being much less authoritative than it once was.
Conclusion
One of the questions posed by analysis of disciplinary cases is whether anything useful can be learned in terms of regulatory policy. It is arguable that analysis of the coal health scandal contains some lessons for the future as well as judgement on the past. It illustrates, for example, the difficulty inherent in regulating situations where clients have only superficial relationships with their lawyers. Large numbers of cases processed by unqualified staff can generate huge profits yet constitute a significant risk to the reputation of the legal profession.
This obviously poses significant risks in a market moving towards greater reliance on internet communication, where a high premium will be placed on the trustworthiness of legal providers. In the introduction to Lawyers in the Dock, Abel quotes Barber's observation that 'trust is ideally the primary mode of control in the relations between professionals and their clients'. 209 Trust is particularly important in relationships between lawyer and client that are 'one off', like the firms' relationship with individual miner clients. The scandal demonstrated not only the potential for large-scale exploitation but also the difficulty of detection. In the event, the miners found champions, but there will inevitably be situations where consumers are unaware that they have been scammed, unsure of their rights, or disinclined to take trouble for the sum involved. This is therefore a challenge for regulatory policy.
In professional relationships, Abel wrote, trust is underwritten by institutions that 'sanction betrayal', 210 but the current thrust of regulatory policy in England Wales is informed by risk analysis and focused on firms. 211 This emphasis recognises the fact that organisations can drive 'good people to do dirty work', but also that the opposite could be true. 212 Risk-based regulatory policy may assume that small firms are responsible for disproportionate numbers of complaints and disciplinary infractions because they lack the infrastructure essential for quality performance, increasing the risk of poor work, financial impropriety and undercapacity. 213 The impact of infractions is generally assumed to be low, including the effect on the profession's reputation. The Avalon case study demonstrates that this is not so. It suggests that regulation should focus on the risk posed by an entity, in terms not only of the likelihood of deviance but also of the consequences in the event of deviance.
A final question posed by the case study is whether the culture of practice can be changed and, if so, how. A specific issue is whether it is sufficient to have a few people responsible for ethical compliance, in charge of large numbers with little or no ethical awareness or responsibility. An alternative or complementary strategy is to have communities of practice where large numbers actively participate. The advantage of this approach is that it acknowledges that the ethicality of practices often depends on context; in some jurisdictions, for example, referral and contingency fee arrangements may be criticised 214 but do not fall foul of conduct rules. This links to the point that where there is doubt there is scope to come to a self-serving conclusion; but for the stringency of professional rules, it might have been difficult to discipline many of the lawyers involved. It is a rich irony that, during the coal health scandal, politicians were calling for fewer ethical restrictions on lawyers. As the referral fee episode illustrates, professional bodies like the Law Society need to resist such calls when they judge it right to do so. Such bodies could continue to have an important role in the formation of professional ethics, despite the severance of their responsibility for 210 Abel (n 172) 5. 211 That is 'the relationship between the corporation's environment (customers, competitors, suppliers and regulations, structure, operating policies, goals and objectives, and so on …)'. Schlegel 
